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Modified fractions, granularity and scale 
structure 
 
Chris Cummins 
 
 
Abstract Pragmatic enrichments arising from the use of modified fractions have been little 
studied, but offer interesting insights into the subtleties of scale structure and granularity. In 
this chapter I present some new experimental data on the interpretation of these expressions. I 
argue that these data suggest that modified fractions, like modified integers, give rise to 
pragmatic enrichments which are conditioned by scale granularity, but that we need to refine 
the notion of granularity somewhat to extend it to this domain. There is also evidence for 
enrichments that are not easily captured in classical quantity implicature terms, but which I 
suggest could be explained by appeal to typicality effects. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Expressions of numerical quantity have been the focus of much study in experimental 
semantics and pragmatics. In many cases, this research is inspired by the realisation that there 
is an incompatibility between the “expected” meaning of expressions, based on mathematical 
considerations, and their communicative meaning in linguistic interactions. Consider, for 
example, (1)-(3). 
(1) Most of the American population is female. (Solt 2016) 
(2) A hexagon has at most 10 sides. (Nouwen 2010) 
(3) London has more than 1000 inhabitants. (Cummins, Sauerland and Solt 2012) 
In each case, we can offer a plausible account of the semantics of the expressions by appeal 
to mathematical considerations. We could argue that “most X is Y” means that the quantity of 
X that is Y exceeds the quantity of X that is not Y; that “at most 10 X are Y” means that the 
quantity of entities that are both X and Y does not exceed 10; and that “more than 1000 X are 
Y” means that the quantity of entities that are both X and Y exceeds 1000.  
Under analyses of this kind, (1)-(3) are true. However, these examples are not unanimously 
judged as true by actual users of language, who consider them anomalous. As in (1), “most” 
is not considered to be felicitous when referring to values just a little above 50%. As in (2), 
“at most n” is not considered to be felicitous when referring to values clearly and invariably 
below n. As in (3), “more than n” is not considered to be felicitous when used out of the blue 
and referring to values far in excess of n. 
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In these cases, and many others besides, there are broadly two possible approaches to 
explaining the lack of felicity. One is to argue that the “mathematical” intuition about the 
semantic analyses is wrong, and that in fact these expressions have a more complex 
semantics (Geurts and Nouwen 2007, Solt 2016). The other is to argue that the anomalies are 
pragmatic, and arise for principled reasons that have nothing to do with the semantics per se 
(Cummins and Katsos 2010).  
Of course, it is quite possible in principle that both explanations are correct, i.e. that the 
semantic analyses are more complex than initially supposed, but these meanings are also 
subject to pragmatic enrichment. None of the specific accounts offered appears to rely on 
both semantic and pragmatic effects – perhaps it would not be parsimonious to do so – but 
nevertheless it seems to be common ground that pragmatic enrichments are somewhat 
widespread in the domain of number.  
Most strikingly, the interpretation of numerals itself has been widely argued to rely upon 
pragmatic factors. Unmodified numerals can convey either a “punctual” or a “lower-bound” 
meaning – that is, (4) can be interpreted as equivalent in meaning either to (5) or (6). In this 
case, our intuition might be that (5) is strongly preferred, but (6) is still available, for instance 
in a context such as (7). 
(4) John has three A-levels. 
(5) John has exactly three A-levels. 
(6) John has at least three A-levels. 
(7) You need three A-levels to be considered for the job. Is John eligible? 
In one class of accounts, the semantics of numerals is lower-bounding and the punctual 
interpretation arises because of a quantity implicature (Gazdar 1979, Levinson 1983, Horn 
1989): broadly, if the speaker of (4) knew that John had four A-levels, she would typically 
say so. On other accounts (e.g. Carston 1998, Geurts 2006, Breheny 2008) the semantics of 
numerals is punctual or underspecified, and pragmatic inference is required either to select a 
meaning or to obtain the lower-bound reading where required. 
Other categories of numerical expression also appear to give rise to pragmatic enrichments, 
but the problem of determining which alternatives are in play is a more complex one. For 
instance, as discussed by Fox and Hackl (2006), (8) does not implicate (9); however, 
Cummins, Sauerland and Solt (2012) show that items such as (10) are widely judged to 
convey meanings such as (11) (but not (12)).  
(8) John has more than four children. 
(9) John does not have more than five children. 
(10) There’s room for more than 80 people. 
(11) There is not room for more than 100 people. 
(12) There is not room for more than 81 people. 
One potential explanation for this difference (Cummins 2012) is that the availability of the 
alternatives depends upon the properties of the numbers involved as well as on the 
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information content of the sentence. On this account, (8) is only felicitous if the speaker is 
ignorant as to the truth or falsity of informationally stronger alternatives, or the precise issue 
of whether John has four or more children is currently under discussion. In either case, the 
stronger assertion (“…more than five…”) is out of court as an alternative, and hence the 
implicature (9) fails to arise. By contrast, (10) could be felicitous even for a knowledgeable 
speaker, as it is a convenient approximation that uses a round number (putatively accessible 
at a lower cognitive cost; cf. Krifka 2002). The corresponding sentence with “…more than 
100…” would be a viable alternative, but that with “…more than 81…” would not, as this 
uses a costlier non-round number. 
Whether or not this particular explanation is along the right lines, it seems inevitable that we 
have to consider the distinct properties of different numbers in order to understand their 
pragmatic behaviour in full. With respect to the issue of unmodified numerals and their 
meaning, it may be possible simply to construe the number line as a homogeneous sequence 
of equally-spaced scale points. However, research on the psychology of number itself 
(Dehaene 1997, Butterworth 1999) clearly indicates that our cognitive representation of 
integers is much more structured than this: some numbers (10, 20, 50, 100, …) are major 
reference points, while others (7, 13, 101, …) are not. And the existence of this structure is 
known to have linguistic consequences: round numbers are more widely used than non-round 
numbers (Jansen and Pollmann 2001), and round numbers are capable of being used to 
express approximate values (Krifka 2002). 
 
2 Expressing fractional quantities 
 
There are several ways in which we can quantify the size of the subdivisions of a whole.1 We 
can do this using scalar quantity expressions (a few/little, some, many/much, most, all), 
percentages, fractions, or derived expressions such as “two out of every five”. And these 
latter numerically-based categories of expression can themselves be further modified by 
expressions such as “more/less than”, “at least/most”, “up to”, “about”, and so on. 
One immediate question that arises is how the availability of these distinct means of 
expression bears upon their perceived meaning. Returning to example (1), repeated below, 
we can see that this could be expressed in various other ways, such as (13)-(15). 
(1) Most of the American population is female. 
(13) More than 50% of the American population is female. 
(14) More than half of the American population is female. 
(15) More than one out of every two Americans is female. 
                                                          
1 As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, we can also use fractions to quantify over parts of things that are not 
obviously characterised as “wholes” – for instance, “half a kilogram of…”. The examples in this chapter all 
concern proportions of a finite quantity, and consequently involve proper fractions (those that lie between 0 and 
1). Given that most uses of fractions for quantities above 1 also involve proper fractions, in combination with 
integers – we usually say “two and a quarter” rather than “nine quarters” – I would expect the observations here 
to apply to the broader class of fractional expressions of quantity. 
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(15) seems potentially anomalous – perhaps “more than one” is initially interpreted as “at 
least two” – but (13) and (14) appear to be valid alternatives to (1). We might then ask 
whether these three options are semantically equivalent, and if they are, whether this has 
pragmatic consequences (for instance, whether one option is marked and thus gives rise to 
some form of markedness implicature). This question is explored in detail, for “most” vs. 
“more than half”, by Solt (2016). 
 
2.1 Inferences from modified fractions 
 
A further question of interest, both for pragmatics and for the nature of the interface between 
number and language, is how the various different expressions of fractional quantity relate to 
one another. Is it the case, for instance, that the use of one modified fraction implicates the 
falsity of another? Consider (16) and (17). 
(16) More than one-fifth of the participants were literature students. 
(17) More than two-fifths of the participants were literature students. 
It seems reasonable to conjecture that the use of (16) by an informed and cooperative speaker 
could be held to implicate the falsity of (17). But this is not obvious on theoretical grounds. 
Note that – to recall again Fox and Hackl’s (2006) observation – (18) does not implicate the 
falsity of (19). 
(18) More than one of the participants was a literature student. 
(19) More than two of the participants were literature students. 
Setting aside the question of precisely why this is so, it is conceivable that (16) could pattern 
with (18), if we consider (16) to be effectively quantifying over the number of “fifths of the 
participants that were literature students”. Thus, one immediate question is whether the 
numerators of modified fractions behave like numerals, for pragmatic purposes. If so, then at 
least some modified fractions will fail to give rise to quantity implicatures that would 
theoretically be predicted, while others may give rise to a restricted class of implicatures, 
negating only a subset of the informationally stronger alternatives. Concretely, for instance, 
we would expect “more than two-fifths” potentially to implicate “not more than three-fifths” 
on this account, but not to implicate “not more than half”, as a half does not correspond to a 
whole number of fifths. 
Considering the whole class of proper fractions, it is clear that we will need some way to 
constrain the set of alternatives that are to be considered in the calculation of quantity 
implicatures. Given any proper fraction, we can identify proper fractions that are arbitrarily 
close to it (in either direction): for a fraction p/q, consider for instance the set {3p/2q, 4p/3q, 
5p/4q, …}. If “more than p/q” were to implicate the falsity of the corresponding expression 
with any other member of this set, it would, in the limit, convey “not more than p/q”, which is 
clearly absurd. In practice we could argue that these quantities are not all calculable by 
speaker and hearer, and not easily expressible, and for one of these reasons the problematic 
implicatures are ruled out of court. However, the question of where to draw the line between 
what can and cannot be inferred is not a straightforward one to resolve on principled grounds. 
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In suggesting (17) as a potentially consequential candidate alternative to (16), I am implicitly 
acknowledging the potential relevance of granularity considerations, in the sense of Krifka 
(2009), in determining which alternatives are pragmatically active. The notion of granularity, 
traceable to Curtin (1995), captures the fact that measured quantity can be reported at various 
different levels of precision, the levels differing specifically in the density of representation 
points. For instance, in the domain of time reporting, “hours” form a coarse-grained scale, 
with “minutes” forming a finer-grained scale, and “quarters” (units of 15 minutes) 
constituting an intermediate scale. (16) and (17) could be argued to be matched in granularity, 
as they are both expressions at the “fifths” level. 
Cummins et al. (2012) argue that granularity is relevant to scalar implicatures, and 
specifically that modified coarse-grained numerals do not implicate the falsity of modified 
finer-grained alternatives. Empirically, it is an open question whether the same claim holds 
for fractions, but in principle the same arguments should apply: the alternatives of finer 
granularity enable the speaker to formulate more informative expressions, but these 
expressions incur a greater cognitive cost, both for the speaker and the hearer. Consequently, 
the speaker’s failure to use a more informative finer-grained alternative can be attributed to 
considerations of cost, rather than being interpreted as a signal that the speaker is not in a 
position to commit to the more informative assertion that would have arisen. Applying this 
reasoning to fractions, we might expect that the use of a coarse-grained modified fraction will 
not give rise to pragmatic enrichments based on the existence of finer-grained alternatives. 
However, we might expect the use of such an expression to give rise to pragmatic 
enrichments related to equally (or more) coarse-grained alternatives. 
 
2.2 The granularity of fractions, and its consequences 
 
Given the definition of granularity, it would be natural to suppose that fractions’ fineness of 
granularity increases with the increasing size of the denominator. If so, the claim articulated 
above can be reformulated as follows: fractions with small denominators will not give rise to 
implicatures concerning alternatives with larger denominators. For instance, the Cummins et 
al. (2012) argument would seem to suggest that (20) should not implicate the falsity of (21). 
(20) More than three-quarters of the participants were literature students. 
(21) More than nine-tenths of the participants were literature students. 
However, there are problems with interpreting the notion of granularity in such an intuitive 
way for the case of fractions. Notably, it raises a potential conflict with Krifka’s (2009) 
observations about the construction of granularity scales. He makes two observations: that 
scales are optimal (in expressive power) if their scale points are distributed in a systematic 
way (for instance, equidistant, or logarithmically distributed), and that “scales of different 
granularity levels should align”.  
The status of Krifka’s (2009) latter observation, about the alignment of scales, is not made 
entirely clear. It could be read as a desideratum in order for granularity scales to be easily 
usable, or it could be read as a requirement in order for two scales to coexist on the same 
underlying domain. All the examples that Krifka discusses involve scales that align in this 
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way, but we can readily imagine candidate pairs of scales that do not: for instance, we might 
count eggs in sixes or twelves, at one granularity level, and in hundreds, at another level. The 
hundreds are not all scale points on the sixes scale. For that matter, we might measure 
distance in miles, at a coarse granularity level, or metres, at a fine granularity level, in which 
case the scale points will (almost) never precisely coincide2. 
The former observation, that scale points should be sensibly distributed, makes tacit appeal to 
the idea that we wish to be able to describe the quantities that we want to talk about 
efficiently in terms of scale points. If the scale points – with which convenient expressions 
are associated – are clustered unevenly and do not span the full range of values that we wish 
to discuss, they are less helpful to us. The appropriate distribution of scale points clearly 
depends on the distribution of the values that we wish to discuss. For instance, a five-point 
rating scale with the options <OK, good, very good, excellent, superb> would be helpful if 
most of the things we want to rate are good to a greater or lesser extent, but unhelpful in 
permitting us to distinguish between things that are variously bad. In the case of expressions 
of proportion, we might reasonably suppose that we would like to be able to discuss all 
values across the range (0, 1) with similar levels of acuity3. 
If we consider proper fractions with a single, fixed denominator q, this criterion is satisfied, 
as they are uniformly distributed between zero and one. If we add to this system a further set 
of fractions with a denominator that is a multiple of q, both of Krifka’s conditions are met. 
However, if we add to the system a set of fractions of a different denominator that is not a 
multiple (or factor) of q, both criteria will be violated: the scale points will not be evenly 
distributed over the range (0, 1), nor will the scale points align. 
To take a concrete example, if our scales are based around halves, quarters and eighths, there 
will be seven equally-distributed scale points between 0 and 1 on the “eighths” scale, three of 
which are also scale points on the “quarters” scale; one of these is also a scale point on the 
“halves” scale. If our scales are quarters and thirds, there are three scale points on the quarters 
scale and two scale points on the thirds scale between 0 and 1, none of which coincide. 
Consecutive scale points in this case are unevenly spaced: the gaps between them are 1/4, 
1/12, 1/6, 1/6, 1/12 and 1/4. 
To illustrate the potential limitations of such a system, imagine that speaker and hearer were 
committed to using a system that relied upon thirds and quarters, that each possible 
expression within this system was equally costly to use, and that the speaker was known to be 
fully knowledgeable and cooperative. A description “more than a quarter” would be highly 
informative in such a system: it would convey that the value in question lay between a quarter 
and a third. By contrast, “more than three-quarters” would be much less informative: it would 
only convey that the value lay in the (three times larger) range between three-quarters and 1. 
This underscores the point that the efficiency of scales depends upon systematic distribution 
of the scale points. Unless it is particularly important for some reason that values in the 
                                                          
2 The International Yard and Pound Agreement of 1959 defines the yard as exactly 0.9144 metres, so in fact a 
mile is exactly 1609.344 metres and 125 miles is thus 201,168 metres. This latter distance is the first point at 
which the scale points for mile and metre coincide. 
3 This assumption may not always be tenable: if we are talking predominantly about rare events, we might find it 
more useful to be able to distinguish events occurring with probability 0.001 and probability 0.01 than to be able 
to distinguish events with probability 0.5 and probability 0.6. However, a simple system of fractions with small 
denominators would perform very badly by this criterion too. 
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middle of the range (0, 1) are especially easy to describe economically and accurately, this 
arrangement is inefficient. 
Intuitively, it seems clear that some denominators that would cause problems in such a 
system – e.g. sevenths – are seldom used. However, it seems very plausible that speakers 
could use a system that employed both quarters and tenths, or halves and thirds, despite such 
a system violating both Krifka’s (2009) criteria. If so, this would suggest either that 
granularity is not an appropriate construct for capturing alternatives in the domain of 
fractions, or that the notion of granularity must be generalised somewhat from Krifka’s 
definition in order to be applied here. 
If we were to allow the notion of granularity to be elaborated or generalised to treat the 
domain of fractions, it is natural to consider whether we should make similar arrangements 
for other systems of quantity. The scale structure of fractions presumably reflects some kind 
of cognitive preference on the part of humans. Jansen and Pollmann (2001: 200) conjecture 
that “doubling and halving (sometimes followed by halving again) are basic means to 
manipulate quantities”, which predicts a central role for halves and quarters in the 
organisation of the system. Among other researchers on the topic, Sigurd (1988) argues for 
the relevance of the base system to numerical cognition, and if applied to the case of 
fractions, this suggests that tenths and hundredths should also have some kind of conceptual 
primacy. Taking these considerations simultaneously into account, we might also predict a 
role for fifths and twentieths in the system. However, if fifths are represented as “pairs of 
tenths”, we might expect them to be cognitively less accessible than tenths, which runs 
counter to the prediction that we would make about fifths and tenths based on standard 
considerations of granularity (i.e. that fifths are coarser-grained and therefore more accessible 
than tenths). 
Moreover, although it seems plausible that the operation of halving is more cognitively 
salient than any other operation of division, it seems perfectly feasible to conceptualise 
entities such as thirds by direct division. If the operation of dividing by three is a great deal 
more complex than that of dividing by two, we might expect thirds to be less accessible than 
quarters, again running counter to a straightforward granularity-based account. 
The above discussion has entirely concerned the denominators of fractions, but we might also 
expect the complexity of the numerators to bear upon how fractions are treated by speakers. 
We could think of a fraction p/q as being represented via a series of stages, in which the 
whole is first divided into q equal parts (perhaps via a series of distinct operations of division) 
and then collections of p of these parts are considered. If this is so, we would expect unit 
fractions – those of the form 1/q, for integer q – to be preferred over other fractions with the 
same denominator. If an individual’s system of fractions effectively comprises a large 
number of unit fractions, plus a few full sets of fractions with special denominators such as 
two, three and ten, this system will have a particularly uneven distribution of scale points: 
specifically, scale points will be clustered near zero. Such a system would be justified if it is 
particularly important to be able to distinguish small proportions from one another with a 
high resolution. 
Could the granularity of fractions have any implications for other expressions of quantity? 
There is clearly a potential interplay, as discussed above in the case of the decimal system: if 
the preference for a particular kind of scale structure arises in for number in general, we 
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could reasonably expect that to carry over to the construction of fractions. The existence of 
the decimal system makes powers of ten especially important in representing and 
manipulating expressions of numerical quantity, and that might also influence our preferences 
as to how we use fractions. Non-decimal systems might also play a part: for instance, the way 
clock time is represented might encourage us to use the operations of dividing by four and 
dividing by 60, and practice with these operations might promote use of the relevant 
fractions. 
In the other direction, if we have internalised a particular system of fractions, presumably we 
will be inclined to apply this when dealing with quantities that – unlike clock time – do not 
have pre-established points of division. If, for argument’s sake, eighths are more salient than 
thirds, we would expect to find eighths being used preferentially as a way of partitioning up 
quantity in a novel domain. Moreover, if it were to transpire that (for instance) three-eighths 
is a more salient fraction than seven-eighths, we might be more likely to talk about units of 
three-eighths in a novel domain than about units of seven-eighths. 
 
2.3 Testing the predictions by appeal to implicature 
 
Granularity has been argued to have several implications for the way in which quantity 
expressions are understood. Krifka (2002) argues that coarse-grained numerals attract 
approximate interpretations, while fine-grained numerals are restricted to precise 
interpretations. In a situation in which 98 people are present, (22) can be judged as true, 
although interestingly (23) cannot, even when 99 people are present. 
(22) There were 100 people there. 
(23) There were more than 100 people there. 
Conversely, (24) is false if exactly 100 people are present, and (25) is true only on an 
existential reading, which is hard to access in this case. 
(24) There were 102 people there. 
(25) There were 98 people there. 
We would expect the same to apply to fractions, but with a possible caveat: namely that all 
the fractions widely used are coarse-grained enough to attract some kind of approximative 
reading. Supposing that the US population were precisely 320 million, we would not 
normally expect (26) and (27) to refer respectively to exactly 160 million people and exactly 
64 million people.  
(26) Half of the US population is clustered in just 146 counties. 
(27) By 2050, one fifth of the US population will be aged 65 or over. 
However, to the extent that fractions get interpreted as approximations, this is not a unique 
attribute: numbers used in continuous measurement behave in much the same way. The 
speaker of (28) is not understood to be referring to a distance of precisely 400cm, let alone 
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4000.0mm. It is fine-grained cardinal quantities that are the exception, in their apparent 
preference for exact readings. 
(28) The passage into the Mound of the Hostages is four metres in length. 
Building upon Krifka’s observations, we could attempt to quantify the salience of particular 
fractions by examining the size of the regions for which they are acceptable approximations 
(with or without the explicit use of a hedge such as “about” or “around”) – that is, the 
diameter of their pragmatic halos, in the sense of Lasersohn (1999). A potential issue to 
address in this case would be dealing with overlapping regions. For instance, if the quantity 
under discussion is 29%, successively less accurate approximations for this would include 
“two sevenths”, “three tenths”, “one quarter” and “one third”, and each of these could be 
presented bare or with a hedging modifier. It is not entirely clear on theoretical grounds 
whether these should all be acceptable, or whether there is some implied trade-off in which 
the acceptability of one term is associated with a decrease in acceptability for the others. This 
might hamper our ability to use data pertaining to the “approximative power” of a fraction as 
a measure of its salience. 
In this chapter I adopt a different approach: I ask participants for range interpretations of 
modified fractions. If these fractions are able to convey quantity implicatures, as argued 
above, then the ranges obtained will depend upon the presence of salient alternatives. 
Acceptance that a range could extend beyond a particular value will thus indicate that that 
value it is not considered to be a sufficiently salient alternative to mandate its usage, even in 
cases where doing so would yield expressions that were semantically true. So, for instance, if 
“more than one quarter” is understood to correspond to the range 25-50%, that indicates that 
“a half” (= two quarters) is a salient alternative to “one quarter”, but also that “one third”, 
“two fifths” etc. are not. 
A potential challenge in adopting this approach is that the format in which participants are 
instructed to give their answers might influence their interpretation. For instance, requiring 
participants to respond in terms of fractions might represent a confound – simpler fractions 
would presumably be privileged in the responses. In the following, the use of percentages 
was adopted to give participants more flexibility in their response: however, it should be 
noted that this also has its limitations, as it might confer an advantage on fractions that are 
expressible in precise percentage terms (for instance, promoting the use of tenths). 
 
3 Experiments: pragmatic bounds for modified fractions 
 
This section reports a series of short experiments designed to explore whether modified 
fractions give rise to pragmatic bounds of the type posited in the above discussion. This 
preliminary research serves partly as a proof of concept and partly as a first attempt to map 
out some of the terrain, by establishing the pragmatic relations that are judged to hold 
between different modified fractions within the system. 
Four versions of the stimuli were created and administered separately. Details of the specific 
stimuli are given below. The general procedure was the same for all sets of stimuli, and was 
as follows. 
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3.1 Method 
 
The experiments were conducted using the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. In each 
version, participants were presented with the following cover story and instructions: 
A market research company has conducted a detailed survey on a large group of people, and 
has written up the results. For instance, “More than 50% of the participants are female”, 
“Less than 20% of the participants own two cars”, and so on. 
You’re now going to read some expressions that have been used to summarise the results 
from the survey. For each one, please state the range of possible values, in percent, that you 
think the expression means.  
For example, if the expression is “about half”, you might say that that means between 45% 
and 55%, or between 40% and 60%, etc. 
There are no ‘correct’ answers: we’re interested in knowing what you think. 
The experimental items consisted of a series of modified fractions presented in a 
pseudorandom order. In each case, the modifier “more than” or “less than” was used, and the 
fraction was presented in word form rather than numerals (e.g. “more than three fifths”). The 
entire list was presented on a single page.  
Responses were coded as “literal” if they reflected the semantic bound without any 
implicature (for example, interpreting “more than four fifths” as corresponding to the range 
80-100%), “pragmatic” if they reflected an inferred bound (for example, interpreting “more 
than four fifths” as corresponding to the range 80-90%), and “error” if the responses failed to 
respect the semantics of the expression (for example, interpreting “more than four fifths” as 
corresponding to the range 60-80%). Where present, pragmatic bounds were recorded and 
analysed. 
 
3.2 Participants 
 
For each version of the experiment, 20 participants were recruited from US locations. Each 
participant was paid $0.50 for participation. 
 
3.3 Experiment 1 
 
Version 1 of the experiment was directed primarily towards establishing whether modified 
fractions towards the edges of the (0, 1) range attracted literal interpretations, and secondarily 
towards establishing whether modified fractions towards the middle of the (0, 1) range 
attracted pragmatic readings that were conditioned by the presence of “one half” in the 
system. 
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3.3.1 Materials 
The following 15 items were pseudorandomised in order and presented in the context of the 
cover story shown above: 
• less than one third / one quarter / one fifth / one sixth / one seventh / one eighth 
• more than two thirds / three quarters / four fifths / five sixths / six sevenths / seven 
eighths 
• more than two fifths / three sevenths / four ninths 
Due to a coding error, “more than two thirds” was omitted and “more than two fifths” was 
repeated within the experiment as administered. 
3.3.2 Results 
The numbers of error, literal and pragmatic responses for each item, along with the pragmatic 
responses given, are presented in the following table. 
Table 1 Results of experiment 1 
Item Error Literal Pragmatic Pragmatic lower/upper bounds 
less than 1/3 1 10 9 5, 5, 10, 10, 11, 15, 25, 25, 26 
less than 1/4 2 9 9 5, 10, 10, 10, 12, 15, 15, 19, 20 
less than 1/5 2 12 6 5, 10, 10, 10, 11, 15 
less than 1/6 1 11 8 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 9, 10, 12 
less than 1/7 3 12 5 5, 5, 10, 10, 10 
less than 1/8 6 10 4 5, 5, 8, 10 
more than 3/4 0 8 12 80, 80, 84, 85, 85, 85, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90, 95 
more than 4/5 3 11 6 89, 90, 90, 90, 95, 95 
more than 5/6 10 4 6 89, 90, 90, 95, 95, 97 
more than 6/7 13 2 5 90, 90, 90, 92 
more than 7/8 4 9 7 90, 90, 90, 93, 95, 95, 98 
more than 2/5 9 10 21 
404, 45, 45, 45, 47, 47, 50, 50, 50, 55, 55, 55, 
55, 60, 60, 60, 60, 60, 60, 60, 60 
more than 3/7 13 3 4 49, 49, 50, 55 
more than 4/9 8 5 7 49, 49, 55, 55, 60, 60, 65 
Total 75 116 109  
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
Generally, participants appear to have been competent with the task: although the overall 
error rate was 75/300 (=25%), the majority of these errors arose in cases involving relatively 
little-used fractions that are not straightforward to convert into percentages. I will not attempt 
to interpret the pragmatics of error responses as we cannot assume the participants’ 
competence with respect to those items. 
Of the 225 semantically correct responses, 109 (=48.4%) exhibited some form of pragmatic 
narrowing, which coheres with the prediction that implicatures are available from modified 
fractions. Most, although not all, of the pragmatic bounds offered by participants correspond 
to potentially salient alternative fractions. Of the 41 pragmatic responses to the “less than” 
items, 13 refer to 5% (1/20) and 14 to 10% (1/10), and of the 36 pragmatic responses to the 
                                                          
4 This corresponds to a “40-40” response, which could reflect error; here I charitably assume that the respondent 
interprets this expression as ruling out anything as high as 41%. 
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corresponding “more than” items, 16 refer to 90% (9/10) – in fact, 18 refer to this alternative 
fraction if we consider 89% also to represent a bound for “less than 9/10”. In the case of 
“more than 2/5”, we see some responses reflecting the presence of “one half” as an 
alternative, but with more responses based on the next point on the fifths scale (3/5, i.e. 60%). 
In addition to these responses, there are some that cannot be easily understood in terms of 
alternative fractions. For instance, 55% is attested as a pragmatic upper bound for “more than 
3/7” and “more than 2/5”. As a fraction, this could be interpreted as corresponding to either 
11/20 or 5/9, neither of which is predicted to be salient (although when 55% occurs as a 
pragmatic upper bound for “more than 4/9”, it seems natural to attribute that to the salience of 
5/9 as an alternative). There are several possibilities as to how these bounds are arising: 
perhaps the presence of “more than 4/9” in the experiment has made ninths atypically salient 
as alternatives, or perhaps the value given reflects an impressionistic range interpretation 
(something more akin to the typicality effects postulated by Geurts and van Tiel (2013)) or a 
compromise between two possible interpretations. However, with this small sample, it is also 
highly plausible that the returned value represents an error, with the participant intending to 
give a percentage value that corresponded to a more salient fraction. We return to this 
question later. 
 
3.4 Experiment 2 
 
Version 2 of the experiment aimed to test whether the repeated use of terms on a specific 
scale, e.g. fifths, would cause alternatives drawn from the same scale to become more salient, 
or whether the presence of coarser-grained alternatives from other scales would condition the 
pragmatic readings that were obtained. 
3.4.1 Materials 
The following 14 items were presented in the context of the same cover story as in 
experiment 1: 
• more/less than one quarter / a half / three quarters 
• more than one fifth / two fifths 
• less than three fifths / four fifths 
• more than one tenth / seven tenths 
• less than three tenths / nine tenths 
The order of presentation was fixed. Participants first saw the items involving quarters and 
halves, then the items involving fifths, and finally the items involving tenths. Within each 
subset of items, the order was pseudorandomised. 
3.4.2 Results 
The numbers of error, literal and pragmatic responses for each item, along with the pragmatic 
responses given, are presented in the following table. 
Table 2 Results of experiment 2 
Item Error Literal Pragmatic Pragmatic lower/upper bounds 
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more than 1/4 1 5 14 
29, 29, 30, 30, 30, 32, 32, 35, 35, 40, 49, 
49, 49, 50 
less than 1/4 0 15 5 15, 15, 15, 20, 20 
more than 1/2 0 9 11 55, 60, 65, 65, 65, 70, 74, 74, 74, 74, 75 
less than 1/2 0 9 11 25, 25, 26, 26, 26, 32, 34, 39, 40, 40, 41 
more than 3/4 0 14 6 79, 80, 84, 85, 85, 90 
less than 3/4 0 7 13 
51, 51, 51, 51, 56, 60, 60, 60, 65, 65, 67, 
70, 71 
more than 1/5 2 7 11 23, 24, 24, 24, 24, 24, 25, 25, 25, 30, 39 
more than 2/5 1 8 11 45, 45, 48, 49, 49, 49, 49, 49, 50, 59, 65 
less than 3/5 4 7 9 49, 50, 51, 51, 51, 53, 55, 55, 56 
less than 4/5 1 8 11 50, 55, 60, 61, 68, 71, 74, 76, 76, 76, 76 
more than 1/10 2 8 10 14, 15, 19, 19, 19, 19, 19, 20, 20, 24 
less than 3/10 1 8 11 20, 20, 20, 21, 21, 25, 25, 26, 26, 26, 26 
more than 7/10 4 7 9 74, 74, 75, 75, 79, 79, 79, 79, 90 
less than 9/10 2 7 11 50, 79, 81, 81, 81, 81, 81, 81, 81, 86, 87 
Total 18 119 143  
 
3.4.3 Discussion 
Participants generally appeared to find this version of the task easier, and returned a much 
lower error rate (18/280 = 6.4%). Just over half the total responses reflected pragmatic 
bounds. 
The absence of finer-grained fractions than quarters from the initial part of the item list seems 
to have made a difference to the interpretation of “less than one quarter” and “more than three 
quarters”. In experiment 1, these attracted 9 literal to 9 pragmatic responses and 8 literal to 12 
pragmatic responses, respectively. In this version, they attracted respectively 15 literal to 5 
pragmatic responses and 14 literal to 6 pragmatic responses. Although neither of these 
differences reaches significance under Fisher’s exact test, the numerical difference is 
suggestive that participants in version 2 of the experiment are inclined to draw implicatures 
based on the next quarter, when presented with a series of stimuli involving quarters. 
However, this is not a hard and fast rule: for instance, most of the responses for “more than 
one quarter” reflect a tighter pragmatic bound than that provided by “not more than a half”. 
It appears that making quarters salient, as scale points, has had some influence on the 
interpretation of subsequent expressions with fifths. “More than one fifth” attracted nine 
responses which could be interpreted as relating to the inference “not more than one quarter”. 
Similarly, “more than two fifths” attracted seven responses which could be interpreted as 
relating to the inference “not more than half (= two quarters)”, and 9 out of 11 pragmatic 
responses for this item involved a bound of 50% or lower. This appears to contrast with 
responses for this item in experiment 1, where the majority of pragmatic responses involved a 
bound above 50%. 
Finally, fifths having been presented, the expressions with tenths gave rise to predictable 
interpretations: the majority of pragmatic responses made reference to the next scale point on 
the tenths scale (which in these cases is also a point on the fifths scale). In the case of “less 
than three tenths” and “more than seven tenths”, responses were split between referring to the 
next tenths scale point and referring to the next quarter. 
14 
 
These preliminary results suggest that the overall picture is complex. Generally, repeated 
reference to a scale appears to make its scale points more salient, which is evident in the 
interpretation of subsequent items referring both to that scale and finer-grained scales. 
However, even under these circumstances, there is no guarantee that participants will choose 
to draw implicatures based on separate coarse-grained scales – e.g. referring to quarters when 
cognising about values expressed in tenths – and may instead draw weaker inferences based 
on the current term’s scalemates. 
 
3.5 Experiment 3 
 
Version 3 of the experiment was designed to test whether the repeated use of a less salient 
scale would exert any effect on the interpretation of subsequent expressions, either using that 
scale or using a different scale. 
3.5.1 Materials 
The following 16 items were presented in the context of the same cover story as in 
experiment 1: 
• more/less than one sixth / one third / two thirds / five sixths 
• more/less than one tenth / three tenths / seven tenths / nine tenths 
The order of items was manipulated such that those involving sixths or thirds were presented 
first, then those with tenths. The order of presentation was pseudorandomised within each 
group of items. 
3.5.2 Results 
The numbers of error, literal and pragmatic responses for each item, along with the pragmatic 
responses given, are presented in the following table. 
Table 3 Results of experiment 3 
Item Error Literal Pragmatic Pragmatic lower/upper bounds 
more than 1/6 7 2 11 19, 20, 20, 20, 25, 25, 25, 30, 30, 40, 50 
more than 1/3 7 3 10 40, 40, 40, 40, 40, 45, 49, 50, 50, 67 
more than 2/3 6 5 9 70, 74, 74, 74, 75, 75, 75, 80, 90 
more than 5/6 10 4 6 90, 90, 90, 90, 95, 95 
less than 1/6 7 6 7 5, 5, 7, 10, 10, 12, 12 
less than 1/3 9 4 7 10, 15, 20, 25, 25, 26, 26 
less than 2/3 6 4 10 40, 40, 44, 50, 55, 55, 55, 55, 60, 60 
less than 5/6 14 2 4 60, 70, 78, 80 
more than 1/10 3 6 11 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 16, 20, 20, 20, 20, 25 
more than 3/10 6 6 8 35, 39, 39, 40, 40, 40, 45, 45 
more than 7/10 3 6 11 74, 75, 78, 79, 79, 79, 80, 80, 80, 90, 90 
more than 9/10 5 11 4 92, 95, 97, 98 
less than 1/10 1 15 4 4, 5, 5, 7 
less than 3/10 5 6 9 10, 20, 20, 20, 20, 21, 25, 26, 26 
less than 7/10 4 6 10 55, 60, 60, 60, 60, 60, 61, 65, 65, 67 
less than 9/10 3 5 12 
10, 70, 70, 70, 79, 80, 80, 81, 81, 85, 85, 
85 
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Total 96 91 133  
 
3.5.3 Discussion 
Unlike the case of quarters (experiment 2), the repeated use of sixths does not appear to elicit 
many pragmatic bounds that refer to thirds and sixths. Within the sixths scale itself, 
participants who derive pragmatic bounds tend to prefer more informative bounds, often 
referring to tenths. When then presented with expressions with tenths, participants do not 
tend to infer bounds referring to thirds or sixths, even in cases where these would be more 
informative than the bounds actually inferred. For instance, “less than seven tenths” attracts a 
modal lower bound of 60%, rather than 67%; all of the eight pragmatic upper bounds offered 
for “more than three tenths” exceed 34%. This suggests that the pragmatic influence of thirds 
and sixths is relatively weak in the participants’ systems of fractions, compared to the 
influence of tenths. In addition, there are high error rates in the conditions involving “five 
sixths” in particular, perhaps suggesting that participants in this experiment had difficulty in 
evaluating this in percentage terms. As noted earlier, this particular experimental setup, 
relying on percentage responses, may be promoting the use of tenths – and perhaps 
disadvantaging the use of thirds and sixths – to an atypical extent. 
 
3.6 Experiment 4 
 
Version 4 of the experiment was intended as a control for version 3, reversing the order of 
presentation, to see whether influence could spread between scales in the opposite direction. 
3.6.1 Materials 
The following 16 items were presented in the context of the same cover story as in 
experiment 1: 
• more/less than one tenth / three tenths / seven tenths / nine tenths 
• more/less than one sixth / one third / two thirds / five sixths 
The order of items was manipulated such that those involving tenths were presented first, 
then those with sixths and thirds. The order of presentation was again pseudorandomised 
within each group of items. 
3.6.2 Results 
One participant failed to finish the task, and a further participant gave decimal responses 
without a clear system, so their results are omitted. The numbers of error, literal and 
pragmatic responses for each item, along with the pragmatic responses given, are presented in 
the following table. 
Table 4 Results of experiment 4 
Item Error Literal Pragmatic Pragmatic lower/upper bounds 
more than 1/10 3 3 12 
14, 15, 15, 15, 19, 19, 19, 20, 20, 20, 20, 
40 
more than 3/10 3 3 12 
35, 36, 39, 39, 39, 40, 40, 40, 40, 50, 55, 
65 
16 
 
more than 7/10 1 4 13 
74, 75, 75, 77, 79, 79, 79, 79, 80, 80, 80, 
90, 90 
more than 9/10 0 14 4 95, 95, 95, 98 
less than 1/10 0 11 7 5, 5, 5, 6, 6, 6, 7 
less than 3/10 6 4 8 5, 10, 17, 20, 20, 21, 25, 25 
less than 7/10 3 4 11 20, 45, 60, 60, 60, 61, 61, 65, 66, 66, 67 
less than 9/10 1 4 13 
50, 55, 75, 76, 80, 80, 80, 80, 80, 81, 81, 
82, 86 
more than 1/6 5 3 10 19, 21, 25, 25, 25, 30, 31, 32, 35, 35 
more than 1/3 6 3 9 39, 45, 45, 48, 49, 50, 50, 65, 65 
more than 2/3 5 6 7 72, 74, 75, 75, 75, 80, 85 
more than 5/6 4 7 7 89, 90, 90, 90, 92, 95, 95 
less than 1/6 5 8 5 8, 10, 11, 12, 14 
less than 1/3 3 6 9 5, 15, 19, 20, 25, 25, 25, 26, 29 
less than 2/3 5 4 9 34, 34, 50, 51, 51, 55, 55, 60, 60 
less than 5/6 6 4 8 70, 70, 70, 75, 75, 75, 76, 78 
Total 56 88 144  
 
3.6.3 Discussion 
The pattern of responses in this experiment closely mirrors that of experiment 3, suggesting 
that the order of presentation makes relatively little difference for these items. Again, there is 
little evidence of thirds and sixths being used as pragmatically relevant alternatives. By 
contrast, tenths continue to be pragmatically relevant when dealing with terms on the 
thirds/sixths scale, but there is no indication that the prior mention of tenths has promoted 
inferences involving tenths. In this case, terms involving “five sixths” did not appear to 
present any particular difficulty to the participants. 
 
3.7 General discussion 
 
The results from these small experiments strongly suggest that people are inclined to interpret 
modified fractions in a pragmatically restricted way, and that a lot of the readings they obtain 
are predictable on the basis of a quantity implicature analysis that considers other salient 
fractions as alternatives. More specifically, the results indicate that quarters and tenths are 
especially pragmatically relevant alternatives, under such an analysis, while the presence of 
other potential scale points (such as thirds) does not give rise to any striking pragmatic 
effects. The presence of literal responses, especially in cases where the pragmatically stronger 
alternatives are not obvious, suggests that participants have not felt obliged to give pragmatic 
responses under these experimental conditions. 
There is also potential evidence here against an account of fractions in which we consider 
them simply to be quantifying over parts – for instance, taking “more than two-fifths” to 
mean “more than two of the fifths”. This approach would explain why some participants 
obtain interpretations involving the negation of the next point on the scale corresponding to 
this denominator (in this case, “not more than three-fifths”). However, it fails to predict 
interpretations also attested in these data which seem to rely upon scale points from other 
scales. Some participants appear to interpret “more than two-fifths” as implicating “not more 
than half” (and similarly for other expressions under test). To explain this purely in terms of 
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quantifying over parts, we would need to read this as an instance of “more than two (fifths)” 
implicating “not more than two-and-a-half (fifths)”, an enrichment which is not generally 
predicted to be available. Thus I take these results to cast doubt on the usefulness of an 
analysis of fractions in which the nominator is treated as though it were a free-standing 
numeral. Having said that, the availability of the weaker (“not more than three-fifths”) 
implicature does suggest that the denominator actually present in the numeral is privileged in 
some weaker sense, and that the use of a particular fraction at least heightens the salience of 
alternative expressions that share this denominator. 
Generally, if these experimental results are an accurate reflection of the reality, we can 
observe that the concept of granularity requires some modification to be applied to the case of 
fractions. As discussed earlier, it appears that major and minor scale points are not 
necessarily aligned in this domain; nor is it clear that coarse-grained scales (defined in terms 
of the distance between successive representation points) are necessarily less cognitively 
costly to work with than finer-grained alternative scales. This raises the broader question of 
whether Krifka’s (2009) criteria for granularity scales should be seen as hard-and-fast rules or 
merely generalisations that admit potential exceptions. 
That said, we should exercise some caution in interpreting the experimental results presented 
here as evidence that tenths, in particular, are necessarily salient scale points. Recall that 
participants were asked to respond using percentages: this system draws attention to the 
possibility of divisibility by ten, and could be argued to make the tenths scale points more 
salient than would otherwise be the case (because they correspond to round numbers in 
percentage terms). Similarly, this methodology could be argued to privilege quarters and 
fifths, whose scale points are expressed as round integer percentages, over thirds, sixths, 
sevenths etc., whose scale points are not. 
Even with this caveat, the experimental findings support a view of the fraction system – as 
represented by hearers – that is more complex than would be supposed based on a naïve 
application of granularity criteria. Participants are able to access readings of modified 
fractions that appear to rely on alternatives of the same or coarser granularity, but also 
sometimes able to access readings that rely on alternatives of finer granularity.  
The availability of such alternatives is for instance, crucial in obtaining restricted readings for 
expressions such as “more than (a) half”, as was achieved by a majority of participants in 
experiment 2. It is striking that these participants all favoured interpretations in which “more 
than a half” conveyed maximally 75% (in most cases, considerably less). Speculatively, we 
might note a potential point of contact here with the literature on “most” (e.g. Solt 2016). As 
discussed earlier, a crucial observation is that “most” is not judged felicitous when referring 
to quantities that are just over 50%, as in (1), repeated below. 
(1)  Most of the American population is female. 
If it is the case that “more than (a) half” attracts a narrower interpretation than would be 
predicted on its semantics, this might suggest that “more than (a) half” is a particularly good 
competitor to “most” for values within its pragmatically typical range (i.e. a little over 50%). 
This in turn might suggest that the distribution of the meanings or interpretations of “most” 
should skew higher. Of course, one could counter that “most” would then run into 
competition from other alternatives (“more than two thirds”, “more than three quarters”) – 
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but it is perhaps reasonable to suppose that they are not such salient options as “more than a 
half”, and consequently that “most” is more likely to be the optimal expression when we are 
dealing with values in that somewhat higher range (assuming that the speaker does not wish 
to commit to a precise value). 
Finally, it is interesting to note that a substantial minority of the responses elicited appear to 
reflect a pragmatic enrichment that does not appear to correspond to a specific and highly 
salient alternative – for instance, “more than two fifths” being judged to convey a value of 
40-47% (two responses in experiment 1). Apart from error on the part of the participants, 
there are several possible reasons for this. It could be that the participants are giving an 
impressionistic response based on something like a typicality effect associated with the 
expression that was used (for instance, having a notion that a 7% range is somehow “about 
right” for this expression). Alternatively, their response may reflect some kind of compromise 
between competing possible enrichments, based on different alternatives. A third possibility 
is that the participants are indeed drawing quantity implicatures based on salient alternatives, 
but that these are not the kinds of alternatives that have been considered in this chapter – for 
instance, participants might think that something above 47% would have been better 
described as “about half”. In order fully to understand the possibility of readings of this latter 
type, we would need to explore the domain of expressions of proportion in much greater 
generality. However, it is perhaps reasonable to assume that the availability of such 
alternatives will be attenuated in experiments which consistently omit these alternatives, as in 
this case (although note that “about half” was presented as an example in the cover story). 
We might therefore hope that suitably designed experiments will enable us fairly 
straightforwardly to control for any interference effects from alternative expressions from 
outside the domain of interest. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
The relatively understudied domain of fractions appears to exhibit a complex structure which 
can be seen as a reflection of cognitive preferences about divisibility and salience. Modified 
fractions give rise to pragmatic enrichments that resemble quantity implicatures, and these 
indicate the presence of salient alternatives within the system. In the experiments presented 
here, quarters and tenths are shown to constitute especially salient scale points, and can 
potentially be seen as the “coarse-grained” representation points in the domain of fractions, 
although the normal rules of granularity do not straightforwardly apply here. Future work will 
aim to map the salience of fractions more thoroughly, and also take into account their relation 
to other expressions of proportional quantity. 
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